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Abstract
We interpret the philosophy of Niels Bohr as related to the so called
“linguistic turn” and consider paraconsistency in the light of the Bohrian
notion of complementarity. Following [16], Jean-Yves Be´ziau has dis-
cussed the seemingly contradictory perspectives found in the quantum
mechanical double slit experiment in terms of paraconsistent view-
points [7, 8]. This interpretation goes in line with the well known
Bohrian Neo-Kantian epistemological account of quantum mechanics.
In the present paper, we put forward the idea that one can also con-
sider, within quantum mechanics and departing from the philosophy
of the danish physicist, a more radical paraconsistency found within
one of the main formal elements of the theory, namely, quantum su-
perpositions. We will argue that, rather than epistemological, the con-
tradictions found within quantum superpositions could be interpreted
as ontological contradictions.
Keywords: quantum superposition, paraconsistent approach, measurement prob-
lem.
1 Interpreting Quantum Mechanics
Regarding its formal structure we could say that quantum mechanics (QM)
seems to be a “finished theory”. In terms of empirical adequacy, it pro-
vides outstanding results, its mathematical structure —developed in the
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first three decades of the 20th century by Werner Heisenberg, Pascual Jor-
dan, Max Born, Erwin Schro¨dinger and Paul Dirac— seems able to predict
any experiment we can think of. However, apart from its fantastic accuracy,
even today, more than one century after its creation, its physical interpre-
tation remains an open problem. In the standard formulation, QM assigns
a quantum mechanical state to a system, but ‘the state’ has a meaning only
in terms of the outcomes of the measurements performed and not in terms
of ‘something’ which one can coherently relate to physical reality [29]. It
is not at all clear, apart from measurement outcomes, what should be the
interpretation of a vector in Hilbert space, in particular, and of the for-
mal structure, in general. If we are to ask too many questions regarding
the physical meaning of the theory, problems start to pop up and simple
answers seem doomed to inconsistency.
From the very beginning of the voyage, the problem of the founding
fathers was to find a picture (an anschauliche content), a physical represen-
tation which would allow to explain what QM was talking about. This idea
guided the early attempt of Luis de Broglie with his matter-wave theory in
1924, and of Schro¨dinger with the introduction of his wave equation in 1926.
It is also well known that Albert Einstein was very uncomfortable with the
unclear reference of QM to physical reality. His concerns were matter of
debate in the 1927 Solvay conference in Brussels and also, later on, his criti-
cisms were exposed in the famous EPR paper written in 1935 [33]. However,
very soon, it became clear that the interpretation of QM faced deep prob-
lems when attempting to provide a coherent description of physical reality.
Due to this impossibility, very soon more pragmatic stances were developed.
For example, Paul Dirac [32, p. 10] writes in his famous book, The Prin-
ciples of Quantum Mechanics: “[...] the main object of physical science is
not the provision of physical pictures, but is the formulation of laws gov-
erning phenomena and the application of these laws to the discovery of new
phenomena. If a picture exists, so much the better; but whether a picture
exists or not is a matter of only secondary importance.” Taking distance
from the physical representation of the formalism, Niels Bohr, one of the
key figures in the creation and development of QM, developed a scheme in
which he restricted the reference of the theory to classical phenomena. His
choice, in resonance with the philosophical movements of the period, deter-
mined the problems and questioning of the future generations of physicists
and philosophers of physics working on the fundamental questions about
quantum theory.
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2 Niels Bohr and the Linguistic Turn in Physics
Niels Bohr might have been the most influential figure who tried —and
succeeded to great extent— to expel metaphysical questions from the debate
regarding QM. As remarked by Arthur Fine:
“These instrumentalist moves, away from a realist construal of the
emerging quantum theory, were given particular force by Bohr’s so-
called ‘philosophy of complementarity’; and this nonrealist position was
consolidated at the time of the famous Solvay conference, in October
of 1927, and is firmly in place today. Such quantum nonrealism is
part of what every graduate physicist learns and practices. It is the
conceptual backdrop to all the brilliant success in atomic, nuclear, and
particle physics over the past fifty years. Physicists have learned to
think about their theory in a highly nonrealist way, and doing just
that has brought about the most marvelous predictive success in the
history of science.” [13, p. 1195]
At distance from anti-metaphysical construals Einstein was a strong de-
fender of physical representation. As recalled by Wolfgang Pauli:
“Einstein’s opposition to [QM] is again reflected in his papers which he
published, at first in collaboration with Rosen and Podolsky , and later
alone, as a critique of the concept of reality in quantum mechanics. We
often discussed these questions together, and I invariably profited very
greatly even when I could not agree with Einstein’s view. ‘Physics
is after all the description of reality’ he said to me, continuing, with
a sarcastic glance in my direction ‘or should I perhaps say physics is
the description of what one merely imagines?’ This question clearly
shows Einstein’s concern that the objective character of physics might
be lost through a theory of the type of quantum mechanics, in that
as a consequence of a wider conception of the objectivity of an expla-
nation of nature the difference between physical reality and dream or
hallucination might become blurred.” [47, p. 122]
It is important to remark that the debate which took place between Ein-
stein and Bohr regarding physical reality can be only understood as part of
the neo-Kantian tradition and discussion which was taking place in German
speaking countries at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.
This discussion is very well exposed by Michael Friedman in his beautiful
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book, A Parting of the Ways [36]. From this perspective, both Einstein and
Bohr were discussing from within representation, considering specifically the
conditions of possibility to access phenomena. Despite the account provided
by many, Einstein and Bohr were not part of the —extensively addressed
in the philosophy of science literature— realist anti-realist debate (see for
discussion [40, 41]).
According to our reading of Bohr,1 the preeminence of language within
his own philosophical scheme can be only understood in relation to the
bigger philosophical movement which was taking place in Europe and has
been called the “linguistic turn”.2 So even though QM arose in relation to
the criticism of Kant’s epistemology —escaping from the domains of the a
priori categories and forms of intuition—, it was soon re-covered by the neo-
Kantian scheme of thought. It was the Danish physicist who was capable of
introducing physics into the philosophical movement of the linguistic turn,
shifting quantum theory from ontological concerns into epistemological ones.
Niels Bohr was the first to initiate the re-turn of physics back into the domain
of philosophy after the revolution produced by relativity theory and QM.
Just like Immanuel Kant did with Newtonian mechanics, turning upside
down the relation of power between physics and philosophy (see [45]), Bohr
was able to constrain the strength of physics within the limitations imposed
by that which would now play the role of the a priori: classical language.3
Niels Bohr’s ideas have played a central role in the development of physics
in the 20th century, placing the discipline within the main philosophical line
of discussion of the period, namely, the problem of language and its rela-
tion to ontology and epistemology. The linguistic turn is a technical term
in the history of philosophy according to which all problems in philosophy
are problems of language. We do not claim that Bohr knew that movement
or was explicitly part of it. Rather, we point to the fact that, quite inde-
1We acknowledge there are almost as many interpretations of Bohr as physicists and
philosophers of science. Even though the orthodoxy has been to interpret Bohr from a
neo-Kantian perspective, there are also ontological interpretations of Bohr such as those
proposed by Folse [34] and Dieks [30]. In particular, Dieks interprets complementarity as
an ontological notion which relates ‘experimental situations’.
2We take the lingu¨istic turn to be a moment with multiple lines of philosophical inves-
tigation which can be comprised by the importance of language as a fundament. See the
interesting analysis of Dardo Scavino in [53].
3It is then not a surprise to notice that the philosophy of Niels Bohr has been directly
engaged with philosophers like Ludwig Wittgentstein (see [46]), Jaques Derrida (see [49]),
and of course, Immanuel Kant (see [42] for an extensive review of the relation between
Bohr and Kant’s philosophy).
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pendently of this movement, Bohr took for himself many of the discussions
and problems involved within such philosophical stance. A clear statement
regarding this point is the famous quotation by Aage Petersen. According
to the long time assistant of Bohr, when asked whether the quantum theory
could be considered as somehow mirroring an underlying quantum reality
Bohr [59, p. 8] declared the following: “There is no quantum world. There
is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we
can say about nature” The problem was then how to secure communication.
Instead of going directly back into Kant’s a priori, Bohr made a detour into
the realm of language, finding his cornerstone, his “clear and distinct idea”
in the the language used by classical physics.
“Even when the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physi-
cal theories, the account of the experimental arrangement and the
recording of observations must be given in plain language, suitably
supplemented by technical physical terminology. This is a clear logical
demand, since the very word experiment refers to a situation where we
can tell others what we have done and what we have learned.” [59, p.
7]
Making his point even more explicit Bohr [59, p. 7] claimed that: “[...] the
unambiguous interpretation of any measurement must be essentially framed
in terms of classical physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the
language of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physicists for
all time.” In this same sense, Bohr seemed to take distance from ontological
questioning. As also noted by Aage Petersen:
“Traditional philosophy has accustomed us to regard language as some-
thing secondary and reality as something primary. Bohr considered
this attitude toward the relation between language and reality inap-
propriate. When one said to him that it cannot be language which
is fundamental, but that it must be reality which, so to speak, lies
beneath language, and of which language is a picture, he would reply,
“We are suspended in language in such a way that we cannot say what
is up and what is down. The word ‘reality’ is also a word, a word
which we must learn to use correctly” Bohr was not puzzled by on-
tological problems or by questions as to how concepts are related to
reality. Such questions seemed sterile to him. He saw the problem of
knowledge in a different light.” [48, p. 11]
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Bohr’s characterization of physics goes then together with his linguistically
based pragmatic account:
“Physics is to be regarded not so much as the study of something
a priori given, but rather as the development of methods of ordering
and surveying human experience. In this respect our task must be
to account for such experience in a manner independent of individual
subjective judgement and therefor objective in the sense that it can be
unambiguously communicated in ordinary human language.” [9] (em-
phasis added)
However, this line of thought —which considers a physical theory in
pragmatic and linguistic terms— might be regarded as ending up in a path
which seems difficult to maintain, at least in the case we are still willing to
state that there is something like “physical reality” of which our theories
talk about. In a spirit very similar to the ideas expressed by Dirac, and
after endless discussions regarding the meaning of the quantum, in the year
2000, exactly one century after the beginning of the voyage, Christopher
Fuchs and Asher Peres finally took this line to its unavoidable conclusion in
a paper entitled: Quantum Theory Needs no ‘Interpretation’. There, they
wrote:
“[...] quantum theory does not describe physical reality. What it does is
provide an algorithm for computing probabilities for the macroscopic
events (“detector clicks”) that are the consequences of experimental
interventions. This strict definition of the scope of quantum theory
is the only interpretation ever needed, whether by experimenters or
theorists.” [37, p. 1]
Of course this emphasis on prediction to the detriment of description can be
severely questioned. The main objection against this instrumentalistic point
of view is that the success of a theory can not be explained, that is to say, we
do not know how and why quantum physics is in general able to carry out
predictions (and in particular with such a fantastic accuracy). Or in other
words, there is no physical representation of what is going on according to
the theory. Undoubtedly a “hard” instrumentalist may simply refuse to look
for such an explanation, since it is in fact the mere effectiveness of a theory
which justifies it, so that he may not be interested in advancing towards
a justification of that effectiveness. If one takes such a position there is
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nothing left to say. Just like the Oracle of Delphi provided always the right
answer to the ancient Greeks, QM provides us with the correct probability
distribution for every experiment we can think of.
3 The Re-Turn of Classical Metaphysics
Since the second world war the philosophical analysis of science, and of
quantum theory in particular, has been an almost exclusive field owned by
analytic philosophy. Although the analytical tradition is an inheritor —
via logical positivism and logical empiricism— of a deep criticism to meta-
physics, strangely enough, within analytic philosophy of physics the attempt
to return to a classical metaphysical scheme of thought seems to be a re-
cursive element, specially in the philosophy of QM during the second half of
the 20th century.
Indeed, the position of Bohr, which can be very well regarded in close
continuation to analytic concerns against metaphysics, was replaced after the
war by approaches to QM, such as, for example, Bohmian mechanics and
DeWitt’s many worlds interpretation, which recovered the classical meta-
physical foundation of thought and understanding. While Bohr attempted
to analyze the logical structure of the theory and concentrated on the analy-
sis of phenomena, these new lines of research intended “to restore a classical
way of thinking about what there is.” [4, p. 74] It seems in this case a bit
ironic that the aversion professed by many philosophers of physics —which
are part of the analytic tradition— to Bohr’s ideas does not recognize the
profound connection of his thought to analytic philosophy itself. These same
philosophers choose —knowingly or not— for metaphysical schemes going
against their own tradition. In the case of many worlds interpretation the
metaphysical step goes as far as to propose non-observable worlds in order
to explain the formal aspects of QM. Also, from a metaphysical point of
view, the many worlds attempt seems to end up in an extreme violation of
Ockham’s principle: “Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity”.4
4Although Lev Vaidman [56] claims that: “in judging physical theories one could rea-
sonably argue that one should not multiply physical laws beyond necessity either (such
a verion of Ockham’s Razor has been applied in the past), and in this respect the many
worlds interpretations is the most economical theory. Indeed, it has all the laws of the
standard quantum theory, but without the collapse postulate, the most problematic of
physical laws.” One could argue however, that due to the existence of modal interpreta-
tions, which are also no collapse interpretations and share the same formal structure as
many worlds, there is no clear argument why one should be forced into this expensive
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In the case of Bohmian mechanics the metaphysical presuppositions got as
far as postulating that QM must talk about classical particles with definite
trajectories. Bitbol notices in this respect [6, p. 8] that: “Bohm’s original
theory of 1952 is likely to be the most metaphysical (in the strongest, spec-
ulative, sense) of all readings of QM. It posits free particle trajectories in
space-time, that are unobservable in virtue of the theory itself.” Further-
more, that which should play the role of space-time in the mathematical
formalism varies its dimension with the addition or substraction of particles
breaking the initial attempt to recover trajectories in space-time. It is not
at all clear that these kind of attempts bring more solutions than problems.
The Danish physicist remained agnostic regarding the metaphysical con-
cerns raised especially by Einstein, but also those of Heisenberg and Pauli.
He tried by all means to restrict his analysis to the empirical data as ex-
posed by classical physical theories and language, and not go beyond the
interpretation of the formalism in terms of a new conceptual scheme. Ac-
cording to Bohr [59, p. 7] “it would be a misconception to believe that the
difficulties of the atomic theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the
concepts of classical physics by new conceptual forms.” Contrary to this
approach, Bohmian mechanics and many worlds interpretations, two of the
most important interpretational lines of research in present philosophy of
QM today compose their analysis with heavy metaphysical commitments
based to great extent in the actualist picture put forward by Newtonian
physics (see for discussion [28]). Rather than starting from the analysis of
the formal structure of the theory, the metaphysical presuppositions consti-
tute the very foundation and center of gravity of such interpretations. Some
of these interpretations even attempt in some cases (e.g., Bohmian mechan-
ics and GRW theory) to change the formalism in order to recover —at least
some of— our classical (metaphysical) conception of the world.
4 Complementarity and Paraconsistency
Paraconsistent Logics (PL) are the logics of inconsistent but non-trivial the-
ories. The origins of PL go back to the first systematic studies dealing with
the possibility of rejecting the PNC. PL was elaborated, independently, by
Stanislaw Jaskowski in Poland, and by Newton da Costa in Brazil, around
the middle of the last century (on PL, see, for example: [17]). A theory
T founded on the logic L, which contains a symbol for negation, is called
metaphysical extension.
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inconsistent if it has among its theorems a sentence A and its negation ¬A;
otherwise, it is said to be consistent. T is called trivial if any sentence of its
language is also a theorem of T ; otherwise, T is said to be non-trivial. In
classical logics and in most usual logics, a theory is inconsistent if, and only
if, it is trivial. L is paraconsistent when it can be the underlying logic of
inconsistent but non trivial theories. Clearly, no classical logic is paracon-
sistent.
In the context of QM, da Costa and Krause have put forward [16] a PL in
order to provide a suitable formal scheme to consider the notion of comple-
mentarity introduced by Bohr in 1927 during his famous ‘Como Lecture’.5
The notion of complementarity was developed in order to consider the con-
tradictory classical representations found in the double-slit experiment; i.e.,
the representation provided by the notions of ‘wave’ and ‘particle’. Accord-
ing to Bohr [16, p. 103]: “We must, in general, be prepared to accept the
fact that a complete elucidation of one and the same object may require
diverse points of view which defy a unique description.” The starting point
of analysis was for Bohr the classical description of experimental arrange-
ments univocally represented by classical language (with the aid of physics).
Bohr considered the wave-particle duality present in the double-slit exper-
iment as expressing the most important character of quantum theory. The
resolution of this duality was provided via his own notion of complementar-
ity. Bohr’s agenda was focused in fulfilling the consistency requirements of
the quantum formalism to apply the well known classical scheme. In this
respect Heisenberg’s principle was only considered as providing the limits
of certainty and applicability of classical concepts as such. The classical
scheme would then remain that which secured the knowledge provided by
QM, and analogously, Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations that which secured
the knowledge provided by the more general principle of complementarity.6
5The logical understanding of complementarity has an interesting history which goes
back to Carl Friedrich von Weizsa¨cker who wrote an article named: “Komplementarita¨t
und Natuurwissenschaft” [58] for Bohr’s 70th birthday. In this article he explained the
concept of complementarity in terms of parallel complementarity and circular complemen-
tarity. The difficulties to understand complementarity is exposed by a rectification added
at the end of the same paper in which von Weizsa¨cker explains that he received a letter
from Bohr expressing that complementarity can be only defined with respect to phenom-
ena, and as the Schro¨dinger wave equation is just an abstract magnitude of calculus and it
does not designate in itself any phenomena, such circular complementarity is by no means
possible and only parallel complementarity should be taken into account.
6It is important to notice that Heisenberg’s relations can be directly derived from the
mathematical scheme of the theory, as a direct consequence of the quantum postulate.
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As Leon Rosenfeld makes the point:
“Bohr wanted to pursue the epistemological analysis one step fur-
ther [than Heisenberg], and in particular to understand the logical
nature of the mutual exclusion of the aspects opposed in the particle-
wave dualism. From this point of view the indeterminacy relations
appear in a new light. [...] The indeterminacy relations are there-
fore essential to ensure the consistency of the theory, by assigning the
limits within which the use of classical concepts belonging to the two
extreme pictures may be applied without contradiction. For this novel
logical relationship, which called in Bohr’s mind echoes of his philo-
sophical meditations over the duality of our mental activity, he pro-
posed the name ‘complementarity’, conscious that he was here breaking
new ground in epistemology.” [59, p. 59]
In [16] the proposal was to go further into the notion of complementary
theories.7
“[...] we shall say that a theory T admits complementarity interpreta-
tion, or that T is a C-theory, if T encompasses ‘true’ formulas α and
β (which may stand for Jammer’s D1 and D2 respectively) which are
‘mutually exclusive’ in the above sense, for instance, that their con-
junction yields to a strict contradiction if classical logic is applied. In
other words, if ` is the symbol of deduction of classical logic, then, α
and β being complementary, we have α, β ` γ ∧ ¬γ for some γ of the
language of T” [16, p. 111]
Today, we have more elements to make precise the relation between both principles, see
for example, the analysis of Pekka Lahti in his thesis [44]. As remarked by J. Hilgevoord
and J. Uffink [39]: “On the one hand, Bohr was quite enthusiastic about Heisenberg’s
ideas which seemed to fit wonderfully with his own thinking. Indeed, in his subsequent
work, Bohr always presented the uncertainty relations as the symbolic expression of his
complementarity viewpoint. On the other hand, he criticized Heisenberg severely for
his suggestion that these relations were due to discontinuous changes occurring during a
measurement process. Rather, Bohr argued, their proper derivation should start from the
indispensability of both particle and wave concepts. He pointed out that the uncertainties
in the experiment did not exclusively arise from the discontinuities but also from the fact
that in the experiment we need to take into account both the particle theory and the wave
theory.”
7This idea of considering complementary theories goes in line with the complementary
descriptions approach proposed in [18].
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The proposal of da Costa and Krause was also considered by Jean-Yves
Be´ziau [8] stressing in his case the notion of viewpoint and taking into ac-
count the Square of Opposition. According to Be´ziau:
“In modern physics we have a subcontrary opposition between wave
and particle in the sense that the proposition ‘K is a particle’ and ‘K is
a wave’ can both be true but cannot both be false. [...] [O]ne may say
that with particle and wave there is an opposition because something
cannot be at the same time a particle and a wave, due to the very
nature of wave and particle, in the same sense that something cannot
be a square and a circle. But why then can we say that ‘K is a particle’
and ‘K is a wave’ can both be true but not that ‘K is a circle’ and ‘K
is a square’ can both be true? In fact it is also possible to say that
these two geometrical propositions are both true, but from a different
perspective, which is not the usual flat one.” [8]
Be´ziau then continues to analyze the situation taking into account more
explicitly the position of Bohr and his complementarity approach.
“[Bohr] argues that there are no direct contradiction: from a cer-
tain point of view ‘K is a particle’, from another point of view ‘K
is a wave’, but these two contradictory properties appear in different
circumstances, different experiments. Someone may ask: what is the
absolute reality of K, is K a particle or is K a wave? One maybe has
to give away the notion of objective reality.” [8]
At this point it becomes clear that the paraconsistency implied by Be´ziau
relates to the perspective assumed by the observer. The contradiction ap-
pears through the choice of the subject between the different experimental
set-ups. Following this idea he develops a logical theory where the central
concept is the concept of viewpoint. The price to pay, as clearly acknowl-
edged by Be´ziau, is to abandon the notion of objective physical reality. In
the following section we will argue that paraconsistency can also help us to
develop a new idea of physical reality that would allow us to consider QM
as a physical theory providing an objective representation of a world outside
there.
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5 Quantum Superpositions and Paraconsistency
In classical physics, every physical system may be described exclusively by
means of its actual properties, taking ‘actuality’ as expressing the preexistent
mode of being of the properties themselves, independently of observation —
the ‘pre’ referring to its existence previous to measurement. Each system
has a determined state characterized mathematically in terms of a point in
phase space. The change of the system may be described by the change of
its actual properties. Potential or possible properties are considered as the
points to which the system might arrive in a future instant of time. As Dieks
makes the point: “In classical physics the most fundamental description of
a physical system (a point in phase space) reflects only the actual, and
nothing that is merely possible. It is true that sometimes states involving
probabilities occur in classical physics: think of the probability distributions
ρ in statistical mechanics. But the occurrence of possibilities in such cases
merely reflects our ignorance about what is actual.” It is then important
to recognize that the main character which makes possible this physical
description in terms of actual properties, and more in general, in terms of
an actual state of affairs is the fact that the mathematical structure allows
a global valuation of all properties [29].
In QM the representation of the state of a system is given by a ray in
Hilbert space H and physical magnitudes are represented by operators on
H that, in general, do not commute. As a consequence, the Kochen-Specker
theorem precludes the possibility of a global valuation of all properties in-
dependently of the context [43]. It then becomes difficult to affirm that
all quantum magnitudes are simultaneously preexistent. In order to restrict
the discourse to different sets of commuting magnitudes, different Complete
Sets of Commuting Operators (CSCO) have to be chosen. The choice of a
particular representation (given by a CSCO) determines the basis in which
the observables diagonalize and in which the ray can be expressed. Thus,
the ray can be written as different linear combinations of states:
αi|ϕB1i > +αj |ϕB1j >= |ϕB2q >= βm|ϕB3m > +βn|ϕB3n > +βo|ϕB3o > (1)
Each linear combination of states is also called a quantum superposition. The
Born interpretation tells us that the numbers that accompany each state in
square modulus compute the probability of finding that particular state. It
is also well known that such probability cannot be interpreted in terms of
ignorance [51, 52]. As remarked by Schro¨dinger in a letter to Einstein:
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“It seems to me that the concept of probability [in QM] is terribly
mishandled these days. Probability surely has as its substance a state-
ment as to whether something is or is not the case —of an uncertain
statement, to be sure. But nevertheless it has meaning only if one is
indeed convinced that the something in question quite definitely is or
is not the case. A probabilistic assertion presupposes the full reality of
its subject.” [12, p. 115]
If we consider a typical Stern-Gerlach experiment, given a spin 1/2 sys-
tem whose state is 1
21/2
| ↑x> +| ↓x>, orthodox QM tells us that we shall
obtain either a ‘click’ in the upper part of the screen with probability 0.5
(which relates to the state | ↑x>), or, a ‘click’ in the bottom part of the
screen also with probability 0.5 (which relates to the state | ↓x>). However,
it is not clear at all what is the state before the measurement since, on the
one hand, one cannot claim due to the formalism of the theory that the
measurement discovers a preexistent actual reality, and on the other hand,
actuality itself precludes the existence of the seemingly exclusive possibili-
ties. According to our interpretation there are good reasons to claim that, in
the just mentioned example, both states (‘| ↑x>’ and |‘ ↓x>’) should be re-
garded as existent —rather than exclusive possibilities. As a matter of fact,
quantum superpositions ‘evolve’ according to the Schro¨dingier equation of
motion, ‘interact’ with other superposition states —creating the famous en-
tanglement of multiple states— and can ‘be predicted’ according to the rules
of QM. But if, within a physical theory there is a mathematical expression
which allows us to calculate the evolution of its terms, its interaction with
other mathematical expressions of the type and predict its possible results,
after or before the interaction, then it becomes reasonable to claim that
there is something “physically real” about such mathematical expression.
The problem at this point is that while these two states, | ↑x> and
| ↓x>, seem to exist before measurement as somehow contradictory states,
the realm of actuality denies —by definition— the existence of contradic-
tions. This weird fact about quantum supertpositions was cleverly explained
by Schro¨dinger through his famous cat experiment which produced a zombie
cat half dead and half alive. At this point one might consider two different
interpretative strategies to solve the paradox. The first, to find the way to
interpret quantum superpositions escaping contradictions, forcing the actual
realm of existence in order to interpret the formalism —e.g. as many worlds
or the modal interpretation of Dieks attempts to do. The second, more rad-
ical path, is to develop a realm of existence which is not that of actuality.
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It is this latter possibility which we find more interesting.
In [14], Newton da Costa together with the author of this paper argued
in favor of the possibility to consider quantum superpositions in terms of
a paraconsistent approach. We discussed the idea that, even though most
interpretations of QM attempt to escape contradictions, there are many
reasons that indicate it could be worth while to assume that the terms in
a quantum superposition can be, in principle, contradictory —as in the
just mentioned example. It should be also stressed that the Paraconsistent
Approach to Quantum Superpositions (PAQS) does not present an inter-
pretation of QM but just a way to account for quantum superpositions in
terms of paraconsistent logics. This formal approach might lead to different
interpretations. However, one may also recognize that intuitively, the ap-
proach might favor an interpretation in which superpositions are considered
as contradictory physical existents.
In [1] Arenhart and Krause raised several arguments against the PAQS,
one of the main concerns having to do with the consideration of quantum
superpositions as contradictory existents. In [25], the author of this paper
argued, firstly, that the obstacles presented by Arenhart and Krause are
based on a specific metaphysical stance, which we characterized in terms of
what we called the Orthodox Line of Research (OLR). Secondly, that this
is not necessarily the only possible line, and that a different one, namely,
a Constructive Metaphysical Line of Research (CMLR) provides a different
perspective in which the PAQS can be regarded as a valuable prospect that
could be used by different interpretations of QM.
It is interesting to point out that the OLR implicitly embraced by Krause
and Arenhart reflects the Bohrian perspective towards the problem of in-
terpretation in QM. Indeed, the OLR has always debated within the limits
imposed by the Danish physicist —this has been Bohr’s true success. As we
have discussed in detail in [25] this path can be condensed in two main meta-
physical presuppositions which block the conceptual development of quan-
tum superpositions. The first presupposition relates to what Bohr called
the correspondence principle, an idea which has been later on reconsidered
in the literature in terms of what is known to be the quantum to classical
limit [10].
1. Quantum to Classical Limit: The principle that one can find a
bridge between classical mechanics and QM; i.e., that the main notions
of classical physics can be used in order to explain quantum theory.
The second metaphysical principle can be also traced back to Bohr’s claim
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that physical experience needs to be expressed exclusively in terms of clas-
sical language [11]. As a matter of fact, if one considers the core of the
classical physical and metaphysical representation of the world one is then
stuck with two main concepts: ‘entity’ and ‘actuality’ (as a mode of exis-
tence). In QM one can also encounter these metaphysical notions as basic
elements of any interpretation.
2. Quantum Systems and Actuality: The principle that one needs
to presuppose the metaphysics of entities together with the mode of
being of actuality in any interpretation of QM.
The idea proposed in [14] to introduce paraconsistency in order to ac-
count for quantum superpositions might be regarded as opening the pos-
sibility to supplement such formal scheme with new non-classical physical
notions. It should be also clear, however, that this is not necessarily the only
option, since the PAQS might be regarded as only a formal proposal. But in
case we would be willing to step into the realm of metaphysics and advance
with an interpretation that accepts contradictory existents, then we must
also come up with a realm of existence different from actuality, breaking the
equation that has ruled physics since Newton: ‘Actuality = Reality’. One
such proposal has been put forward in [23].
As we have argued extensively in [25], if we now go into the problem
of interpretation, the idea presented by the PAQS can be supported by the
CMLR which imposes a different perspective towards QM, its problems and
the questions that need to be answered. Taking into account the need to
provide a coherent physical interpretation of QM, our CMLR is based on
three main presuppositions:8
1. Closed Representational Stance: Each physical theory is closed
under its own formal and conceptual structure providing access to a
specific set of phenomena. The theory provides the constraints to
consider, explain and understand physical phenomena.
2. Formalism and Empirical Adequacy: The formalism of QM is
able to provide (outstanding) empirically adequate results. Empirical
adequacy determines the success of a theory and not its (metaphysical)
commitment to a certain presupposed conception of the world. The
problem is not to find a new mathematical scheme, on the contrary,
8This proposal was put forward and discussed in [20, pp. 56-57]. See also [24].
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the ‘road signs’ point in the direction that we must stay close to the
orthodox quantum formalism.
3. Constructive Stance: To learn about what the formalism of QM is
telling us about reality we might be in need of creating new physical
concepts.
What is needed according to the CMLR is a radical inversion of orthodoxy
and its problems. According to this inversion, for example, the question of
contextuality is not a problem which we need to escape but rather a cen-
tral characteristic that any interpretation of QM should respect. Also the
non-separable character of QM, its specificity with respect to identity and in-
dividuality, its indeterminate and indeterministic aspects, etc., should be all
considered —rather than obstacles— as the main elements that can guide us
in the development of a coherent interpretation of the theory. Going back to
the meaning of quantum superpositions, instead of considering the measure-
ment problem we should focus instead on the analysis of what we have called
the superposition problem (see for discussion [25]). The constructive stance
assumes the radical possibility to consider a different mode of existence.
Elsewhere [20, 21, 23], we have put forward a notion of ontological poten-
tiality which allows us to discuss an independent realm of existence which
—contrary to the orthodox approach to potentiality— cannot be reduced to
actuality. Indeed, the PAQS, properly supplemented by the CMLR, allows
us to interpret quantum superpositions in terms of potential contradictory
existents.
6 Epistemological and Ontological Contradictions
From the above discussions, it is interesting to notice that the use of para-
consistency in QM can be considered from two very distinct perspectives,
according to the philosophical stance that one assumes in order to approach
interpretational issues. On the one hand, we have the paraconsistency im-
plied by the epistemological approach to QM which deals with the “con-
tradiction” between multiple classical representations. As remarked by da
Costa and Krause:
“It should be emphasized that our way of characterizing comple-
mentarity does not mean that complementary propositions are always
contradictory, for α and β above are not necessarily one the negation
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of the other. However, as complementary propositions, we may derive
from them (in classical logic) a contradiction; to exemplify, we remark
that ‘x is a particle’ is not the direct negation of ‘x is a wave’, but ‘x
is a particle’ entails that x is not a wave. This reading of complemen-
tarity as not indicating strict contradiction, as we have already made
clear, is in accordance with Bohr himself [...]” [16]
This could be understood as an epistemological contradiction since it deals
with different perspectives or, in terms of Beziau, “complementary view-
points”. On the other hand, the paraconsistency discussed within the PAQS
implies a more radical stance regarding the meaning of contradictions. In-
deed, as we have mentioned above, quantum superpositions —according to
the PAQS— seem to open the door to consider “contradictory existents”.
Thus one might argue that the PAQS attempts to put forward the introduc-
tion of ontological contradictions.
As remarked by Aristotle: “It is impossible for the same thing to belong
and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same
respect.” [Metaph. IV 3 1005b1920] On the one hand, it seems that this
is not the case of epistemological contradictions which deal with different,
rather than contradictory, representations. It makes no sense to say that
“a wave is contradictory to a particle”. On the other hand, ontological
contradictions do talk about the same property in the same respect and
at the same time. If we consider our earlier Stern-Gerlach experiment the
state of affairs is described by the following quantum superposition: 1
21/2
| ↑x
〉 + | ↓x〉, which includes the propositions: ‘spin up in the x direction’ and
‘spin down in the x direction’. Both propositions make reference to the same
property of spin.
The introduction of the realm of potentiality reconfigures in itself the
meaning of contradiction which has been always considered in terms of the
actual realm. Indeed, once we accept the idea that we can have existents
in the potential realm we can go further and understand contradictions as
related to the path between the potential and the actual realms. If we now
take into account the square of opposition we must consider the following
set of definitions:
Contradiction Propositions: α and β are contradictory when both
cannot be true and both cannot be false.
Contrariety Propositions: α and β are contrary when both cannot
be true, but both can be false.
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Subcontrariety Propositions: α and β are subcontraries when both
can be true, but both cannot be false.
Subaltern Propositions: α is subaltern to proposition β if the truth
of β implies the truth of α.
The idea that potentiality determines a contradictory realm goes back
to Aristotle himself who claimed that contradictions find themselves in po-
tentiality. Of course, as remarked by Arenhart and Krause, the square of
opposition is discussing about actual truth and falsehood. Thus, potential-
ity is not considered in terms of a mode of existence but rather as mere
logical possibility. The introduction of an ontological realm of potentiality
changes things drastically. The interesting question is if our representation
of quantum superpositions in terms of powers is compatible with the square.
We believe it easy to see that such is the case provided special attention is
given to the realms involved in the discussion.
Truth and falsehood are considered in relation to actuality, since in the
orthodox view this is the exclusive realm imposing the limits of what can
be understood as real. Contrary to the actualist scheme, our notion of
ontological potentiality is completely independent of actuality, and thus it
makes perfect sense to extend ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ to this mode of being.
We have investigated this possibility in [26]. Our redefinition of truth and
falsehood with respect to potentiality escapes any subjective choice and
regains an objective description of physical reality. The price to pay is to
abandon the idea that everything needs to be defined in terms of the actual
realm.
Consider we have a Stern-Gerlach apparatus placed in the x direction,
if we have the following quantum superposition: α | ↑x> + β | ↓x>, this
means we have ‘spin up in the x direction, | ↑x><↑x |, with probability α’
and ‘spin down in the x direction, | ↓x><↓x |, with probability β’ which can
be actualized. Is it contradiction or contrariety the best notion suited to
account for such existent possibilities9 in this quantum experiment? Given
this quantum superposition, it is clear that both actualizations of the powers
(elementary processes) ‘| ↑x><↑x |’ and ‘| ↓x><↓x |’ cannot be simultane-
ously ‘true’ in actuality, since only one of them will become actual; it is
also the case that both actualizations of the powers (elementary processes)
‘| ↑x><↑x |’ and ‘| ↓x><↓x |’ cannot be simultaneously ‘false’ in actuality,
9We have developed an interpretation in which such existent possibilities are discussed
in terms of the notion of power. See [21, 23].
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since when we measure the quantum superposition we know we will obtain
either the elementary process ‘spin up in the x direction’, ‘| ↑x><↑x |’, or the
elementary process ‘spin down in the x direction’, ‘| ↓x><↓x |’. As we know,
given a measurement on the quantum superposition, α | ↑x> + β | ↓x>, one
of the two terms will become actual (true) while the other term will not be
actual (false), which implies that both cannot be false.
7 Final Remarks
In this paper we have discussed different approaches regarding the meaning
and use of paraconsistency in QM. We have shown how this subject, from
very different perspectives, both epistemological and ontological, can pro-
vide an interesting discussion and development of the theory. We hope to
continue this analysis in future papers.
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